“Confirmed Judges, Confirmed Fears” is a blog series documenting the harmful impact of President Trump’s judges on Americans’ rights and liberties. It includes judges nominated in both his first and second terms.
What’s at stake in this case?
A former federal prisoner sought to collect money damages from state officials who clearly violated his rights under the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
What happened in this case?
Damon Landor is a Rastafarian whose religious beliefs require him to leave his hair unshorn. He was sentenced to jail in Louisiana, and for the first part of his confinement, prison officials respected his beliefs. For the last several weeks of his sentence, however, he was transferred to another jail. Because he was concerned about how he would be treated, when he arrived, he explained his beliefs to officials and provided a copy of a recent court decision requiring accommodation of religious beliefs like his. “Unmoved,” a guard threw the decision and other papers “in the trash.” Landor was taken to another room, held down by guards, and had his head shaved, contrary to his objections and religious beliefs.
After serving his time, Landor filed suit against Louisiana prison and other officials, both under state law and RLUIPA. The district court ruled his claim for injunctive relief was now moot since he had been released, and held as a matter of law that RLUIPA did not permit him to sue the prison officials for damages. The Supreme Court agreed to hear his case to address the damages issue.
Trump justices Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett cast deciding votes in a 6-3 ruling by Gorsuch in June that denied Landor’s claim and affirmed the rulings below in Landor v Louisiana Dept. of Corrections. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote a strong dissent, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
What was the rationale of the majority?
Writing for the majority, Gorsuch maintained that since it was enacted under the Spending Clause, RLUIPA binds state prison systems that accept federal funds, but does not create a cause of action against state officials unless they “voluntarily and knowingly” consent to such lawsuits. That obviously did not happen here. It would be as if someone brought a breach of contract claim, they suggested, against someone who had never agreed to the contract.
Why did Justices Jackson, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissent?
Justice Jackson strongly disagreed, explaining that the ruling would leave prisoners like Landor “remediless” when their religious liberty is violated. She carefully explained why the majority’s contract analogy was flawed, noting that it contradicted other Court decisions, such as the holding that the Title IX provision against sex discrimination and the command in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act against religious discrimination both authorize the recovery of damages. The notion that officials must “voluntarily and knowingly” consent to RLUIPA lawsuits against them, she went on, “discards decades” of precedent and “devalues precedent and congressional authority alike.”
Why is this decision harmful?
The RLUIPA ruling made possible by Trump justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett significantly undermines the law’s protection of religious liberty for prisoners and other confined persons. It also threatens other legislation imposing civil rights and other requirements on state and local officials based on the Spending Clause. It contradicts the views of a wide range of groups, ranging from People For the American Way to the Trump Administration, who filed briefs with the Court in support of Landor. In addition, the ruling illustrates the importance of our federal courts to health, welfare and justice and the significance of having fair-minded judges on the federal bench.